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Abstract. We consider a model in which a free daily newspaper distributes news to
readers and sells ad-space to advertisers, having private information about its readership.
Depending on the type of readers in the market, the newspaper’s may have a “plentiful and
seeking” audience or a “lacking and avoiding” audience. We find that if the readers are
plentiful and seeking, the newspaper prints an excessive number of copies. The rationale
for this over-printing strategy lies on the newspaper’s need to send a credible signal to the
advertisers that there are plentiful and seeking readers in the market. When the readers
are lacking and avoiding, the newspaper chooses the socially optimal tirage (does not try
to cheat the advertisers).
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1 Introduction
Motivation and leading research questions
The boom of freely distributed newspapers is one of the most striking changes taking
place in the press industry. The first modern freely distributed newspaper was released
in Sweden in 1995 (the free daily “Metro”) and in less than ten years, the market of
freely distributed papers has developed in a spectacular way. The circulation figures of
free daily newspapers are impressive and they illustrate quite well the rise of free daily
press. According to the World Association of Newspapers, in 2001, the total circulation
of freely distributed newspapers was already close to ten million daily copies (see Bakker,
2002). Six years later, in 2007, the total circulation of free dailies was substantially higher,
with more than forty million copies of free dailies being printed every day (Bakker, 2007).
More recently, the market of free dailies is starting to stabilize as the market of free daily
newspapers starts to reach its maturity in some regions (like Europe).
Like any other newspaper, free dailies can be viewed as a platform between readers
and advertisers. Analogously to paid press, the industry of free daily newspapers exhibits
a two-sided market structure (Anderson and Coate (2005), Dukes and Gal-Or (2003),
Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001, 2002, 2004), Furhoff (1973), Gustaffson (1978) and
others). To the side of readers, free dailies supply news, editorial content and advertising
content. To the side of advertisers, free dailies provide the “eyeballs” of their readers.
The specifics of the free dailies (in relation to paid press) lie on the strategy that they
use to bring both sides of the market on board. Within the business model adopted by
freely distributed papers, readers are totally subsidized by advertisers. To obtain greater
advertising profits, free dailies give up making any profits on their readers. Free distribu-
tion widens their potential audience, making them more attractive to advertisers. When
buying an ad-insertion from a free daily, potential advertisers are ultimately interested in
reaching the largest possible audience. The larger is the number of “eyeballs” captured
by free dailies, the higher is advertisers’ marginal revenue from buying an ad-insertion in
these newspapers. Thus, having a greater audience, free dailies are able to charge higher
ad-rates and/or sell ad-insertions to a larger number of firms.
In the light of the free dailies’ business model, the benefit of bringing an additional
copy to the market corresponds to the additional advertising revenues generated by this
copy (the audience of the newspaper becomes larger, which makes the newspaper more
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attractive to advertisers). The cost of bringing this additional copy in the market cor-
responds to the cost of printing it and distributing. When the number of copies that a
free daily brings to the market (tirage) is such that the marginal benefit of bringing the
last copy to the market is equal to its marginal cost, the free daily’s tirage is said to be
socially efficient (or Pareto optimal).
In a scenario of complete and symmetric information, as printing is costly and both
the free daily and the advertisers are fully informed about the daily’s readership, a freely
distributed newspaper never has incentives to over-print (nor under-print).
However, in the real markets, a scenario of perfect and complete information is hard
to find. Advertisers are frequently less informed than the newspaper about its readership.
In the case of paid press, as readers must pay for the newspaper, advertisers can infer
the newspaper’s audience from its circulation (no reader would be willing to pay for the
newspaper, if it was not planning to read it). However, in the case of freely distributed
dailies, readers do not pay for the newspaper and, therefore, even if the newspaper has
been delivered in the reader’s hands, she/he may simply prefer to drop it in the garbage
instead of reading it. Hence, in the market of free dailies, it is common to observe a
mismatch between the number of people to whom the newspaper is delivered and the
effective number of the readers of the newspaper (who are the only ones that are exposed
to the newspaper’s ad-insertions).
Since the newspaper is able to observe, more easily than the advertisers, the number
of leftovers at distribution points and the number of vendors that are needed to distribute
all the copies, it is reasonable to assume that the newspaper is better informed than
the advertisers about the size and/or the characteristics of its readership. Consequently,
the assumption of perfect and symmetric information is very often inappropriate in the
context of free dailies and therefore, it is not guaranteed that free dailies’ tirage coincides
with the socially efficient tirage levels.
A free daily may be interested in deviating from the socially optimal tirage level to
manipulate advertisers’ beliefs about the size and the characteristics of its readership. As
long as the cost of bringing extra-copies to the market (production cost and distribution
cost) is sufficiently small, free dailies may adopt over-printing strategies in order to induce
advertisers to over-estimate the newspaper’s audience and increase their willingness to pay
for the ad-insertions.
In this paper, we aim to study if the business models adopted by free dailies have
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endogenous mechanisms favouring over-printing strategies in a context of asymmetric
information.1
Literature overview
The paper is closely related to the recent and flourishing literature dealing with the
analysis of the two-sided structure of media industries (see, for example, Anderson and
Coate (2005), Dukes and Gal-Or (2003) and Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001,
2002)). It adds to this literature by introducing the possibility of asymmetric information
between advertisers and a freely distributed newspaper.
Our paper also contributes to the huge literature dealing with signalling and economic
decisions in a context of asymmetric information (Spence (1973), Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), Wilson (1977), Myerson (1983), Cho and Kreps (1987)). When developing the
formal model to introduce asymmetric information in the market of freely distributed
papers, we borrow a lot from Maskin and Tirole (1992). They study a principal-agent
relationship in which the principal is more informed than the agent about a variable
that directly affects the agent’s payoff. Their model is, therefore, particularly suitable to
study the interaction between advertisers and the freely distributed newspaper: the latter
is better informed than the former about its readership, which is a key determinant of
the advertisers’ benefits associated with the ad-insertions.
Method
To investigate whether the business model of free dailies leads to over-printing or not,
we build on the work of Maskin and Tirole (1992) to develop a theoretical model that
explicitly takes into consideration the informational asymmetry between advertisers and
freely distributed dailies. To keep our analysis as simple as possible, we consider the case
of a monopoly market, in which the monopolist free daily provides advertising space to
a group of advertisers that is less informed than the newspaper about its readership. In
particular, we consider that the newspaper’s readership can be one of two types: “plentiful
and seeking” readers or “lacking and avoiding” readers. While the newspaper is able to
1Our research question was partly inspired by some recent events related to the so-called “London
freesheet war”. This “war” refers to the very aggressive competition between two free dailies in London:
the London Lite and the London Paper, with both newspapers being accused of following anti-competitive
and predatory strategies. From our viewpoint, one of the most striking episodes of this war occurred in
April 2007, when London Lite argued that London paper vendors were dumping copies of the paper they
were distributing in the garbage (over-printing strategy).
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observe the type of demand, the advertisers are not (adverse selection problem).
Being uncertain about the type of readers in the market, the advertisers try to infer
from the newspaper’s tirage whether the free daily’s readership is “plentiful and seeking”
or, on the contrary, “lacking and avoiding”. In this scenario, an adverse selection problem
arises since the newspaper may have incentives to over-print to make the advertisers
believe that the readership is “plentiful and seeking”. In the light of this adverse selection
problem, advertisers may not believe that the newspaper’s readership is “plentiful and
seeking” when they observe that the tirage of the newspaper is relatively high.
We study to which extent the free daily newspaper uses the tirage as a signal to
advertisers about the type of readers in the market, and we investigate to which extent
the over-printing problem is relevant, if the newspaper uses tirage as a signal.
The interaction between the free daily and the advertisers is analyzed within a principal-
agent setting. We consider a game with the following structure. First, nature selects the
type of readers in the market, which becomes private information of the newspaper (princi-
pal). Advertisers remain uncertain about the true type of readers in the market. Having
private information about the characteristics of the readers, the newspaper proposes a
contract which specifies a tirage and an advertising rate. The advertisers (agents) decide
whether or not to accept the contract proposed by the newspaper, taking into consider-
ation their priors regarding the type of readers in the market as well as any additional
information conveyed by the proposed tirage and advertising rate.
To characterize the equilibrium contracts proposed by the free paper contingent on its
readership, we rely on the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), following the
method suggested by Maskin and Tirole (1992).
Main findings
The first contribution of the paper is to shed light on the adverse selection problems
that may arise when a freely distributed newspaper is better informed than advertisers
about its readership. If the newspaper’s cost of bringing additional copies to the market
is sufficiently small, it becomes impossible for advertisers to infer whether a high tirage is
due to the newspaper’s large readership, or if it is just a strategy used by the newspaper
to making them believe that the readership is “plentiful and seeking”, when in reality it
is “lacking and avoiding”.
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The second contribution of the paper is to show that when these adverse selection
issues arise, the newspaper will use its tirage as a signal to advertisers about the true
readership. Our model unveils that, in this case, the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
in pure strategies that survives the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) corresponds
to the least-cost separating contract, whose characteristics are the following: when the free
daily’s readership is “lacking and avoiding”, the paper chooses the socially optimal tirage
(no distortion at the bottom); otherwise, the paper chooses an excessive tirage, signalling
to the advertisers, credibly, that the readership is “plentiful and seeking” (distortion at
the top).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic ingredients
of the model. Section 3 presents the symmetric information case, as a benchmark. Section
4 characterizes the optimal contract under asymmetric information. Section 5 concludes
the paper with some remarks.
2 The model
We consider a monopolist newspaper, whose activity consists in producing news that are
freely distributed to readers and in selling “eyeballs” to advertisers.
The readership of the freely distributed newspaper is denoted by R (θ, T ), where T ≥ 0
stands for the publicly observable number of copies that the newspaper decides to print
and distribute, and θ ∈ {θL, θH} is a parameter that describes whether the readers in the
market are “lacking and avoiding” (L) or “plentiful and seeking” (H).
The larger the tirage, the larger is the readership of the newspaper (because readers
have lower searching costs), but this effect is decreasing with the tirage of the newspaper.
For a given tirage, the readership is higher when the readers are plentiful (H) than when
they are lacking (L).
Assumption 1 (Readership)
R (θ, 0) = 0, RT (θH , T ) > RT (θL, T ) > 0 and RTT (θ, T ) < 0.
On the other side of the market (advertising), the newspaper sells ad-space to N homo-
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geneous advertisers. The payoff obtained by the representative advertiser is:
V (θ, T )− p. (1)
The reservation payoff of the advertisers is zero.
We assume that, for a given tirage, the advertisers’ expected return from buying ad-
space is higher when the readers are plentiful (H) than when they are lacking (L).
We also assume that the larger is the readership of the newspaper, the larger is the
advertisers’ expected return from investing in ad-space, and that this effect is decreasing
with the number of copies printed by the newspaper.2
Assumption 2 (Advertising return)
V (θ, 0) = 0, VT (θH , T ) > VT (θL, T ) > 0 and VTT (θ, T ) ≤ 0.
The profits of the monopolist newspaper are equal to the revenues from selling ad-space
to advertisers net of the newspaper’s production and distribution costs:
pi (θ, T, p) = Np− c (θ, T ) .
We assume that there are no fixed costs, and that the marginal cost of printing and
distributing is positive and increasing with the tirage.
We also assume that when the readers are avoiding (L), the marginal distribution cost
of the newspaper is higher than when readers are seeking (H).
Assumption 3 (Production cost)
c (θ, 0) = 0, cT (θL, T ) > cT (θH , T ) > 0 and cTT (θ, T ) > 0.
Finally, we make the following assumptions to guarantee that the solution is interior, i.e.,
that the tirage is strictly positive and finite.
2Assuming that V is a concave function of R yields these assumptions on V .
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Assumption 4 (Interior solution)
NVT (θL, 0) > cT (θL, 0) and lim
T→∞
[NVT (θH , T )− cT (θH , T )] < 0.
The timing of the game is the following:
1. Nature selects the type of readers in the market, selecting θ = θL with probability qL
and θ = θH with probability qH = 1− qL.
2. The newspaper privately observes the type of readers in the market, θi, and proposes
a contract (Ti, pi) to the advertisers.
3. The N advertisers accept (or reject) the contract proposed by the newspaper.
4. The newspaper prints and distributes Ti copies, the readership is R(θi, Ti), the payoff
of the newspaper is Npi − c(θi, Ti) and the payoff of the representative advertiser is
V (θi, Ti)− pi.
Before investigating the characteristics of the contract proposed by a newspaper with
private information, we describe (in the following section) the market outcome in the case
of symmetric information.
3 Benchmark: Symmetric information
In the case of symmetric information, the type of readers in the market is common knowl-
edge of the newspaper and the advertisers.
This section investigates what are the characteristics of the optimal contract proposed
by the newspaper, which depends on the type of readers that is observed. To this end,
we rely on backward-induction techniques to solve the symmetric information version of
the game previously described.
Given a proposal (Ti, pi) and the value of θi (which, in the context of symmetric
information, is common knowledge), the payoff of the representative advertiser is:
V (θi, Ti)− pi,
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and advertisers accept the contract (Ti, pi) if and only if:
V (θi, Ti)− pi ≥ 0.
In the first stage, the newspaper maximizes its profit subject to the advertisers’ par-
ticipation constraint. The problem of the newspaper is:
max
(Ti,pi)
{Npi − c(θi, Ti)} s.t. pi ≤ V (θi, Ti).
Since the newspaper (principal) has all the bargaining power, it is able to capture all
the surplus from advertisers. Hence, the advertisers’ participation constraints are binding:
pSIi = V (θi, Ti) .
Therefore, the problem of the newspaper can be written as an unconstrained maxi-
mization problem:
max
Ti
{NV (θi, Ti)− c (θi, Ti)} .
The solution to this problem is given by the first order condition:
NVT (θi, Ti) = cT (θi, Ti) ,
because the second order condition,
NVTT (θi, Ti)− cTT (θi, Ti) < 0,
is always verified.3
Therefore, when i = L, the symmetric information contract is given by:
T SIL : NVT
(
θL, T
SI
L
)
= cT
(
θL, T
SI
L
)
;
pSIL = V
(
θL, T
SI
L
)
.
3Recall that we are assuming that VTT < 0 and cTT > 0.
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Analogously, when i = H, the symmetric information contract is:
T SIH : NVT
(
θH , T
SI
H
)
= cT
(
θH , T
SI
H
)
;
pSIH = V
(
θH , T
SI
H
)
.
The optimality conditions show that, in the symmetric information benchmark, ad-
vertisers obtain their reservation payoffs, as the monopolist newspaper extracts all their
surplus. Furthermore, the newspaper’s tirage is socially efficient. Regardless of the type
of readers in the market, the newspaper’s tirage assures a perfect balance between the so-
cial marginal benefit of printing an additional copy, NVT
(
θi, T
SI
i
)
, and the corresponding
marginal cost, cT
(
θi, T
SI
i
)
.
Figure 1 identifies the equilibrium contracts proposed by the newspaper in the case
of symmetric information. The solid lines identify the optimal contract when the type of
readers in the market is H, while the dashed lines identify the optimal contract when it
is L. The symmetric information contracts are efficient, being located at tangency points
(equality between the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of an additional copy).
Figure 1: Optimal contracts under symmetric information.
Figure 1 also illustrates the fact that, when the type of readers in the market is
H, the newspaper prints more copies and charges higher advertising rates than when
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the type of readers in the market is L. From the assumptions cT (θH , T ) < cT (θL, T )
and VT (θH , T ) > VT (θL, T ), it follows that T
SI
H > T
SI
L . This, in turn, implies that
V (θH , T
SI
H ) > V (θL, T
SI
L ) and p
SI
H > p
SI
L .
We now turn to the case of asymmetric information, in which the type of readers in
the market is private information of the newspaper.
4 Asymmetric information
This section introduces asymmetric information about readers’ characteristics. At the
moment of contracting, the newspaper is better informed than the advertisers. While the
newspaper observes the true value of θ, the advertisers only know the prior probability
distribution of θ.
4.1 Deviation from the symmetric information contract
With asymmetric information, the contracts proposed by the newspaper may not be the
contracts
(
T SIL , p
SI
L
)
and
(
T SIH , p
SI
H
)
derived in the previous section. When the type of
readers in the market is θL, the newspaper may have incentives to deviate from
(
T SIL , p
SI
L
)
to
(
T SIH , p
SI
H
)
, particularly if advertisers believe that the type of readers in the market is
θH when the contract
(
T SIH , p
SI
H
)
is offered to them.
The following Proposition (proved in the Appendix) identifies in which circumstances
asymmetric information about the type of readers in the market originates deviations
from the optimal contracts
(
T SIL , p
SI
L
)
and
(
T SIH , p
SI
H
)
.
Proposition 1 (Deviation)
When the type of the readers in the market is private information of the newspaper
and advertisers believe that θ = θi when confronted with contract
(
T SIi , p
SI
i
)
, then: (i) for
θ = θH , the newspaper prefers contract
(
T SIH , p
SI
H
)
over contract
(
T SIL , p
SI
L
)
; (ii) for θ = θL,
the newspaper is better-off by deviating from contract
(
T SIL , p
SI
L
)
to contract
(
T SIH , p
SI
H
)
if
and only if:
c
(
θL, T
SI
H
)− c (θL, T SIL ) < N [V (θH , T SIH )− V (θL, T SIL )] . (2)
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If condition (2) is violated, the newspaper does not deviate neither for θ = θH nor for
θ = θL. Therefore, the asymmetric information outcome coincides with the symmetric
information benchmark. When θ = θL, the newspaper does not prefer
(
T SIH , p
SI
H
)
because
of the high cost of printing and distributing additional copies. It does not pay off to make
advertisers believe that the state of the nature is θ = θH .
In the rest of the paper, we seek to characterize the optimal contract assuming that
condition (2) holds.
4.2 The optimal contract
If the newspaper has private information about the characteristics of the readers, and if
condition (2) holds, the symmetric information contracts are not optimal. Regardless of
the type of readers, the newspaper always prefers the contract
(
T SIH , p
SI
H
)
. Anticipating
this behavior, advertisers do not believe that θ = θH when the contract
(
T SIH , p
SI
H
)
is
offered to them. They reject, therefore, such contract.
The probabilities that the advertisers use to compute the contract’s expected payoff
are their interim beliefs about the type of readers, conditional on the contract (T, p) that
is offered by the newspaper. The advertisers’ interim beliefs are denoted by µ (T, p) =
[µL (T, p) , µH (T, p)], with 0 ≤ µi (T, p) ≤ 1 and µL (T, p) + µH (T, p) = 1.
The newspaper and the advertisers have a principal-agent relationship with an in-
formed principal and common values.4 To characterize the optimal contract for each type
of readers, we will seek a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game that satisfies the
Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion.5
Below, A(T, p, µ) denotes a strategy of the representative advertiser, which consists in
accepting or rejecting a contract, (T, p), when holding some interim beliefs, µ.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium)
A vector of strategies, {(T ∗L, p∗L), (T ∗H , p∗H) , A(T, p, µ)}, and an interim beliefs function,
4The party that proposes the contract has superior information (informed principal), and this infor-
mation enters the objective function of the other party (common values).
5The intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) excludes unreasonable interim beliefs out of the
equilibrium path.
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µ(T, p), constitute a pure-strategy equilibrium when: (i) the strategies (T ∗L, p
∗
L), (T
∗
H , p
∗
H)
and A(T, p, µ) are optimal, given the interim beliefs function, µ(T, p); (ii) the interim
beliefs in equilibrium, µ(T ∗L, p
∗
L) and µ(T
∗
H , p
∗
H), are obtained using Bayes’ rule; and (iii)
the interim beliefs out of equilibrium satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion.
It is possible to conceive two kinds of equilibria: separating and pooling. In a separating
equilibrium, the characteristics of the contract offered by the newspaper depend on the
type of readers in the market, i.e., (T ∗L, p
∗
L) 6= (T ∗H , p∗H). Therefore, by observing the
contract proposed by the newspaper, advertisers are able to infer the type of the readers
in the market. In this case, interim beliefs correspond to revelation: µ(T ∗L, p
∗
L) = (1, 0)
and µ(T ∗H , p
∗
H) = (0, 1).
In a pooling equilibrium, the contract that is proposed by the newspaper is independent
of the type of the readers in the market, i.e., (T ∗L, p
∗
L) = (T
∗
H , p
∗
H) = (T , p). In this case, the
contract proposed by the newspaper does not convey any additional information. Hence,
the interim beliefs are equal to the prior beliefs: µ(T , p) = (qL, qH).
We will show that the optimal contracts, (T ∗L, p
∗
L) and (T
∗
H , p
∗
H), correspond to the least-
cost separating equilibrium, which can be obtained by sequentially solving the following
optimization programs:
max
(TL,pL)
[NpL − c (θL, TL)] s.t. (Prog. I)
pL ≤ V (θL, TL) (IR)
and
max
(TH ,pH)
[NpH − c (θH , TH)] s.t. (Prog. II)
pH ≤ V (θH , TH) ; (IR)
NpH − c (θL, TH) ≤ Np∗L − c (θL, T ∗L) , (ICC)
where (T ∗L, p
∗
L) solves Program I.
Proposition 2
The unique pure-strategy equilibrium is the least-cost separating equilibrium.
Proof: The proof follows directly from the results obtained by Maskin and Tirole (1992).
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We can apply their Proposition 2, because the sorting assumption holds (see Claim 1 in
the Appendix) and the reservation utility of the advertisers is independent of θ. Therefore,
in our game, the Rotschild-Stiglitz-Wilson allocation relative to the reservation allocation
is the least-cost separating allocation.
Since the least-cost separating allocation is interim efficient relative to some strictly pos-
itive beliefs (see Claim 3 in the Appendix), by their Theorem 1 and Proposition 7, it is
the unique equilibrium allocation. 
4.3 Characterization of the equilibrium contract
We have shown that the unique pure-strategy equilibrium is the least-cost separating equi-
librium, illustrated in Figure 2, and characterized below (see Claim 2 in the Appendix).
Figure 2: Optimal contracts under asymmetric information.
No distortion at the bottom
When the readers are “lacking and avoiding”, the optimal contract with asymmetric
information, (T ∗L, p
∗
L), coincides with the symmetric information contract. The newspaper
14
captures all the surplus, as the advertising rate is p∗L = V (θL, T
∗
L). The tirage, T
∗
L, is
socially eficient, NVT (θL, T
∗
L) = cT (θL, T
∗
L).
Distortion at the top
Under condition (2), when the type of readers in the market is θH , the newspaper proposes
an excessive tirage, relatively to the symmetric information case, T ∗H > T
SI
H . This credibly
signals to the advertisers that the readers are plentiful and seeking. The resulting profit
of the newspaper is lower than in the case of symmetric information, while the advertisers
remain with their reservation utility, p∗H = V (θH , T
∗
H).
5 Concluding remarks
We have investigated whether free daily newspapers have incentives to print an excessive
number of copies in order to convince the advertisers that the readership of the newspaper
is larger than it actually is.
Our framework is a principal-agent model in which the newspaper, knowing whether
the potential readership is low or high, proposes a contract to the advertisers which
stipulates the tirage and the price of advertisements. We have found that the newspaper
chooses an excessive tirage when the demand is high, to convince the advertisers that the
demand is, in fact, high. When the demand is low, the newspaper chooses the socially
optimal tirage, as in the case of symmetric information.
Besides shedding some light on a relevant economic issue, we expect that this work
may have contributed to the incorporation of asymmetric information in the study of
two-sided markets. Here, we have considered a degenerate scenario, in which one side of
the market (advertisers) cares about the other (readers), but not vice-versa. More general
scenarios should be considered in future work, in order to study the case of paid press
and to investigate how the readers’ attitude toward advertising may damped or enhance
the incentives of the newspaper to over-print.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: The tirage T SIH , with T
SI
H > T
SI
L , is optimal for θ = θH ,
therefore:
NV
(
θH , T
SI
H
)− c (θH , T SIH ) > NV (θH , T SIL )− c (θH , T SIL ) . (3)
Since, by assumption, V
(
θH , T
SI
L
)
> V
(
θL, T
SI
L
)
, from (3) it follows that:
NV
(
θH , T
SI
H
)− c (θH , T SIH ) > NV (θL, T SIL )− c (θH , T SIL ) ,
or, equivalently:
N
(
pSIH − pSIL
)
> c
(
θH , T
SI
H
)− c (θH , T SIL ) > 0.
This implies that, for θ = θH , the newspaper always obtains higher profits with con-
tract
(
T SIH , p
SI
H
)
than with contract
(
T SIL , p
SI
L
)
. With asymmetric information, the contract
is still accepted by the advertisers (as they believe that θ = θH).
Since advertisers believe that θ = θH when confronted with
(
T SIH , p
SI
H
)
, then, for
θ = θL, the newspaper deviates from
(
T SIL , p
SI
L
)
to
(
T SIH , p
SI
H
)
if and only if:
NV
(
θH , T
SI
H
)− c (θL, T SIH ) > NV (θL, T SIL )− c (θL, T SIL ) ,
yielding condition (2). 
Claim 1 When the marginal cost of printing is higher for θ = θL than for θ = θH , the
sorting assumption of Maskin and Tirole (1992) holds.
Proof: (i) The values of T and p can be any real number.6
(ii) The advertisers’ payoff increases with T and decreases with p at a rate that is greater
than some  > 0. The profit of the newspaper is such that piT (θ, T, p) = −cT (θ, T ) < −
and pip (θ, T, p) = N > .
(iii) Given any u¯ and v¯, there exists a finite solution to the problem:
6Assumption 4 guarantees that we always obtain a strictly positive tirage.
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max
(T,p)
piH(T, p) s.t. piL(T, p) ≤ v¯ and V (θH , T )− p ≥ u¯,
which is equivalent to:
max
(T,p)
{Np− c(θH , T )} s.t. p = min{ 1N [c(θL, T ) + v¯] , V (θH , T )− u¯}.
To prove this, we only need to check that it is optimal to select a finite T . From As-
sumption 4, we know that, for T greater than some T0, the restriction that is binding is
p = V (θH , T )− u¯. Ignoring the other restriction, the problem becomes:
max
T
{NV (θH , T )−Nu¯− c(θH , T )} .
The first order condition, NVT (θH , T ) = cT (θH , T ), holds (by Assumption 4) at a finite
value of T , denoted T1. Therefore, it cannot be optimal to increase T above max {T0, T1}.
(iv) cT (θL, T ) > cT (θH , T ) ⇒ −piT (θL, T, p) > −piT (θH , T, p).
Since pip (θL, T, p) = pip (θH , T, p) = 1, we have:
−piT (θL,T,p)
pip(θL,T,p)
> −piT (θH ,T,p)
pip(θH ,T,p)
. 
Claim 2 The least-cost separating allocation is such that:
(i) When θ = θL, the least cost separating contract (T
∗
L, p
∗
L) coincides with the sym-
metric information contract. The advertising rate is p∗L = V (θL, T
∗
L) and the tirage, T
∗
L,
is such that NVT (θL, T
∗
L) = cT (θL, T
∗
L);
(ii) When θ = θH , the newspaper has a higher profit, pi
H∗ = piL∗+c(θL, T ∗H)−c(θH , T ∗H),
while the advertisers remain with their reservation utility, p∗H = V (θH , T
∗
H). There is an
excess of tirage relatively to the symmetric information case, T ∗H > T
SI
H .
(iii) 0 <
cT (θL,T
∗
H)−cT (θH ,T ∗H)
cT (θL,T
∗
H)−NVT (θH ,T ∗H) < 1.
Proof: (i) Follows directly from the definition of least-cost separating allocation.
(ii) Under condition (2), the ICC restriction in Program II is binding.
Suppose that the IR condition in Program II is not binding. The problem becomes:
max
TH
{Np∗L + c(θL, TH)− c(θL, T ∗L)− c(θH , TH)} .
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This would yield TH = 0 and pH > 0, violating the IR condition. Therefore, both
restrictions are binding. The newspaper has a higher profit if θ = θH while the advertisers
remain with their reservation utility:
NV (θH , T
∗
H)− c(θL, T ∗H) = NV (θL, T ∗L)− c(θL, T ∗L),
p∗H = V (θH , T
∗
H).
With both restrictions, the Lagrangian of Problem II is:
L = NpH−c(θH , TH)−λ1 [NpH −NV (θH , TH)]−λ2 [NpH − c(θL, TH)−Np∗L + c(θL, T ∗L)] .
The first order conditions are:
∂L
∂pH
= 0 ⇒ λ1 + λ2 = 1,
∂L
∂TH
= 0 ⇒ −cT (θH , TH) + λ1NVT (θH , TH) + λ2cT (θL, TH) = 0,
where λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0 (both restrictions are binding).
Therefore:
−λ1cT (θH , TH)− (1− λ1)cT (θH , TH) + λ1NVT (θH , TH) + (1− λ1)cT (θL, TH) = 0 ⇔
⇔ NVT (θH , TH)− cT (θH , TH) = 1− λ1
λ1
[cT (θH , TH)− cT (θL, TH)] < 0,
which implies that T ∗H is greater than T
SI
H .
(iii) We also have:
λ1 =
cT (θL, T
∗
H)− cT (θH , T ∗H)
cT (θL, T ∗H)−NVT (θH , T ∗H)
,
with 0 < λ1 < 1. 
Claim 3 The RSW allocation relative to the reservation allocation, [(T ∗L, p
∗
L), (T
∗
H , p
∗
H)],
is interim efficient relative to some strictly positive beliefs, (qˆL, qˆH).
Proof: According to Maskin and Tirole (1992), the allocation [(T ∗L, p
∗
L), (T
∗
H , p
∗
H)] is in-
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terim efficient relative to beliefs (qˆL, qˆH) if it solves the following optimization problem
for some vector of positive weights (wL, wH), with 0 ≤ wL ≤ 1 and wH = 1− wL:
max
(TH ,pH),(TL,pL)
[
wLpi
L(TL, pL) + wHpi
H (TH , pH)
]
s.t. (Prog. IE)
piL(TL, pL) ≥ piL(TH , pH), (ICC of type L)
piH(TH , pH) ≥ piH(TL, pL), (ICC of type H)
qˆLV (θL, TL) + qˆHV (θH , TH)− qˆLpL − qˆHpH ≥ 0. (IR)
To see that the ICC of type H is not binding, subtract from it the ICC of type L:
piH(TH , pH)− piL(TH , pH) ≥ piH(TL, pL)− piL(TL, pL) ⇒
⇒ c(θL, TH)− c(θL, TL) ≥ c(θH , TH)− c(θH , TL),
which is true (since marginal cost is lower when θ = θH) for any TH ≥ TL.
It is straightforward to see that the least-cost separating allocation satisfies all the restric-
tions. We now show that it satisfies the first order conditions.
The Lagrangian is:
L = wLpiL(TL, pL) + wHpiH (TH , pH) + λ1
[
piL(TL, pL)− piL(TH , pH)
]
+
+λ2
[
piH(TH , pH)− piH(TL, pL)
]
+
+λ3 [qˆLV (θL, TL) + qˆHV (θH , TH)− qˆLpL − qˆHpH ] .
With λ2 = 0, for pH and pL, we have:
∂L
∂pH
= 0 ⇔ wHN − λ1N − λ3qˆH = 0⇔ λ3 = N (wH − λ1)
qˆH
;
∂L
∂pL
= 0 ⇔ wLN + λ1N − λ3qˆL = 0⇔ λ3 = N (wL + λ1)
qˆL
.
Since wL = 1− wH , this implies that λ1 = wH − qˆH and λ3 = N .
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For TL and TH , we have:
∂L
∂TL
= 0 ⇔ −(wL + λ1)cT (θL, TL) + λ3qˆLVT (θL, TL) = 0;
∂L
∂TH
= 0 ⇔ −wHcT (θH , TH) + λ1cT (θL, TH) + λ3qˆHVT (θH , TH) = 0.
Replacing λ1 = wH − qˆH and λ3 = N :
NVT (θL, TL) = cT (θL, TL);
qˆH [NVT (θH , TH)− cT (θL, TH)] = wH [cT (θH , TH)− cT (θL, TH)] .
Let k =
cT (θL, T
∗
H)− cT (θH , T ∗H)
cT (θL, T ∗H)−NVT (θH , T ∗H)
.
From Claim 2, we know that [(T ∗L, p
∗
L), (T
∗
H , p
∗
H)] verifies the first condition, and that
0 < k < 1. It verifies the second condition for wH =
qˆH
k
.
If qˆH is sufficiently low, we have wH ≤ 1, which means that the least-cost separating
allocation is interim efficient relative to beliefs (qˆL, qˆH).
7 
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